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Introduction
Krikor Haitaian survived the Hamidian massacres hiding in a chicken coop.1 He was just four
years old in 1895 when the violence swept through his village of Göydün in Ottoman Turkey.
Ninety years later, he recalled how the Turkish perpetrators were allowed three hours in which
to pillage and plunder, seizing Armenian goods and livestock with impunity. The men of his
village ed to the elds and hid. Haitaian recounts: “When the Turks rushed into our village my
mother took the axe and sent us to the henhouse. She was standing behind the door to protect
us, to kill any Turk that might approach us. Then the Turk saw the axe…he left and ran away.
He couldn’t rob anything.”2 In this extraordinary act of bravery, Haitaian’s mother may very
well have saved his life. Her erce determination to resist the massacres was clear. “If any Turk
came in to hurt us,” Haitaian recalled, “she was going to knock him, and chop him up.”3
Haitaian’s incredible tale highlights the determination of one Armenian family to survive,
despite the desperate circumstances that prevailed. Such tenacity was widespread. In villages,
towns, and cities through Anatolia, Armenians did whatever they could to resist the onslaught.
The Hamidian massacres, also known as the Armenian massacres, were a series of
massacres that swept through Ottoman Turkey between 1894 and 1896. In many respects, they
were the culmination of longstanding discrimination and persecution experienced by
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.4 The Armenians were considered giaours, or in dels, of
inferior status and subject to of cial discrimination. As the empire declined in the nineteenth
century, tensions grew between the Armenian population, and the Turkish and Kurdish
populations with whom they were closely intermingled. By the early 1890s, many Armenians
were experiencing increasing persecution and hardship. In Sassoun, local events led to an
outbreak of massacres in 1894, which claimed approximately six thousand lives.5 British,
French, and Russian outrage at the atrocities led to a Scheme of Armenian Reforms being agreed
upon between the Great Powers and the Ottoman government.6 Yet, a year after the Sassoun
massacres, the reforms—which included such major changes as proportional representation for
Armenians amongst administrators, police, and gendarmerie in six provinces—were still
awaiting Ottoman government signature.7 In the capital Constantinople, an Armenian protest
at the delay was set upon by the gendarmerie, leading to riots.8 The violence escalated into
massacres throughout much of the empire between October and December 1895. With the
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coming of the new year, they largely abated; but the situation remained extremely tense,
and there were sporadic outbursts of violence. In August 1896, the seizure of the Imperial
Ottoman Bank in Constantinople by the Dashnaktsutiun Armenian revolutionary party
sparked a further massacre, claiming approximately 6,000 lives.9 This, and a massacre
shortly thereafter in Egin, were the final large-scale massacres in what became known as the
Hamidian massacres; however, Armenians continued to experience persecution and
violence. Altogether, the Hamidian massacres claimed between 100,000 and 200,000 lives.10
Hundreds of thousands more were left destitute.
The Hamidian massacres have received quite limited attention in the literature. As
terrible as they were, they were quickly overshadowed by the subsequent Armenian
genocide. More than one million Armenians were killed in the Young Turks’ attempt to
annihilate the Armenian population in Turkey from 1915 onwards. Scholarly attention has
focused predominantly on this genocide, not least because of the Turkish government’s
ongoing campaign of denial. Within the scholarship on the massacres, the topic of
Armenian resistance has attracted little attention. Although some key incidents have been
detailed, as far as is known, there has been no study dedicated to examining the occurrence,
prevalence, and types of resistance employed during the massacres overall. The present
study seeks to address this gap through an exploratory analysis of resistance. After
conceptualizing resistance and outlining the research design, the study examines the
Armenian capacity for resistance, and the contours of that resistance—including scope,
organization, and strategies employed. It then examines the boundaries of Armenian
resistance, before reflecting on its outcomes. Finally, the article concludes by considering
how an analysis of resistance can contribute to our understanding of the massacres more
broadly, and particularly the vexed question of the role of the Ottoman government in their
perpetration.
Conceptualizing Resistance to Mass Violence
The concept of resistance to mass violence gained considerable scholarly attention in the
aftermath of the Holocaust. Raul Hilberg, in The Destruction of the European Jews—widely
regarded as the first comprehensive historical account of the Holocaust—considered the issue
of resistance as part of his analysis. Hilberg defined resistance as “opposition to the
perpetrator,” which in practice, he conceptualized narrowly, as armed, group resistance.11
Taking issue with Hilberg’s definition, a number of scholars subsequently proposed a more
inclusive understanding. Yehuda Bauer defined Jewish resistance to the Holocaust as “any
group action consciously taken in opposition to known or surmised laws, actions or
intentions directed against the Jews by the Germans and their supporters.”12 Bauer’s
definition of resistance included forms of unarmed resistance, such as smuggling food into
ghettos to avoid starvation, and activities taken to improve morale and maintain cultural
practices. Spiritual resistance became accepted as a component of resistance to the
Holocaust.13 Later, Bauer reflected that perhaps individual acts of resistance also merited
inclusion, although he perceived this as a “slippery and awkward topic,” as “what to include
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and what to exclude is difficult to determine.”14 Roger Gottlieb further explored the concept
of resistance, highlighting the importance of intention. He defined resistance as “the attempt
by the oppressed to limit, thwart, or end that oppression.”15 Gottlieb also highlighted the
importance of identity within both the processes of oppression and resistance. Importantly, he
questioned whether there is “a distinction between resistance and simply trying to stay
alive?”16 An act to transfer oppression away from oneself to another member of the oppressed
group may not be resistance, as “the goal of resistance must be to lessen the total quantity of
oppression.”17 Yet, in circumstances in which the perpetrators seek the total annihilation of
the oppressed, this distinction may not be valid. In these circumstances, simply choosing life
becomes an act of resistance.18
This scholarship provides important insights into conceptualizing resistance. Its
utility is somewhat limited, however, by its heavy contextualization within discussions of the
Holocaust. The very different circumstances of the Holocaust and the Hamidian massacres
meant that possibilities and strategies for resistance within each were quite different. Many
examples used to define the boundaries of resistance during the Holocaust do not have ready
parallels in the massacres. Turning to scholarship on resistance to the Armenian genocide,
there is a similar evolution from narrow conceptions of resistance as armed resistance, to
more inclusive definitions that include civilian and nonviolent resistance. While earlier
authors on the genocide, such as Vahakn Dadrian, concentrated heavily on armed resistance,
recent contributions have recognized a wider range of activities as constituting resistance.
Raymond Kévorkian, for example, has discussed Armenians burning their harvests prior to
deportation as an act of resistance.19 Khatchig Mouradian has defined resistance as “actions
carried out illegally, or against the sanction and will of the authorities, to save Armenian
deportees from annihilation.”20 This includes nonviolent acts of humanitarian resistance.
Importantly, such a more inclusive definition also allows for greater recognition of the
contributions of women to resistance.21 To incorporate the insights offered by the scholarship
on resistance to the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, while recognizing the unique
circumstances of the Hamidian massacres, the current study avoids a rigid definition of
resistance. Resistance is broadly defined in accordance with Gottlieb’s definition, as an
“attempt by the oppressed [individual or group] to limit, thwart or end that oppression,”
where such an attempt seeks to “lessen the total quantity of oppression.”22 A certain leniency
has been accorded to consider specific actions as potential acts of resistance on a case-by-case
basis, and to facilitate analysis of grey zone activities that may or may not be considered as
resistance.
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Resistance during the Armenian Genocide
Armenian resistance to the 1915 genocide has been well-documented, with many important
scholarly contributions in recent years.23 Major sites of resistance are well-known. Perhaps the
most famous—later becoming the subject of a novel and lm—occurred at Musa Dagh, in the
province of Aleppo.24 There, more than four thousand villagers, after being given the order to
prepare for deportation in July 1915, chose instead to retreat up a nearby mountain and attempt
self-defense. After battling Turkish attacks for several weeks, they were rescued by French
forces and evacuated to Egypt. In Van, thirty thousand Armenians sought to defend themselves
from the genocidal campaign. They survived constant attacks and a siege, to ultimately be
saved by the advance of the Russian army into the city. Other attempts at armed resistance were
unsuccessful, such as those in Ourfa, Sassoun, and Zeitoun. Scholars have also examined cases
of rescue. Several thousand Armenian refugees who reached Sinjar, for example, were taken in
and protected by the local Yezidi population.25 Many other cases of smaller-scale rescue in a
range of circumstances have been documented, although undoubtedly others will never be
known.26 Historians have recognized, however, that a combination of Turkish planning, the
powerlessness of the Armenians, and a hostile Turkish population made resistance impossible
in most circumstances during the genocide.27 Whereas there is good knowledge of the contours
of resistance during the genocide, much less is known about that during the Hamidian
massacres, to which the article now turns.
Methodology
In order to elucidate key facets of resistance to the massacres, this research adopts an
exploratory research design. This design was chosen due to the very limited amount of previous
research on the topic. An exploratory approach enables the researcher to investigate a
phenomenon not yet well understood. It allows for a certain uidity in de nitions and
boundaries that can accommodate unexpected discoveries. A dynamic and dialectic inferential
process can be utilized to progress the research, developing insight into the phenomenon under
study without preset hypotheses limiting scope. Nonetheless, a clear structure guides the
research. A four-tiered framework provides the analytic lens through which resistance is
examined, incorporating the following:

23

See, for example, Mouradian, The Resistance Network; Ugur Ümit Üngör, “Conversion and Rescue: Survival Strategies
in the Armenian Genocide,” in Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue, ed. Jacques Semelin et al. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Carlos Bedrossian, “Urfa’s Last Stand, 1915,” in Armenian Tigranakert/
Diarbekir and Edessa/Urfa, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2006), 467–507; Simon
Payaslian, “The Armenian Resistance in Shabin Karahisar, 1915,” in Sebastia/Sivas and Lesser Armenia, ed. Richard
G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2004), 399–426; Anahide Ter Minassian, “Van 1915,” in Armenian
Van/Vaspurakan, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2000), 209–244; Khatchig Mouradian,
“The Very Limit of our Endurance: Unarmed Resistance in Ottoman Syria during World War I,” in End of the
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1. Consideration of the circumstances in which resistance was
possible.
2. Exploration of the contours of resistance, including the
strategies employed, scope, and organization of resistance
efforts.
3. Examination of the boundaries of resistance, and grey-zone
activities.
4. Analysis of the outcomes of the resistance, and the resulting
impact on the Armenian people.
Additionally, the research ndings with respect to resistance will be discussed in light
of their implications for our understanding of the massacres overall.
Careful selection of appropriate sources is critical for research on the Hamidian
massacres. There is widespread evidence of a “pattern of of cial misrepresentation” within
of cial Turkish sources concerning them.28 Death tolls, and estimates of those wounded, for
example, appear to vastly and systematically underrepresent true gures.29 Furthermore,
Turkish of cials have “sanitized the archives so that researchers today will nd almost no
documentation incriminating Ottoman Turkish leaders in the ethnic cleansings between 1894
and 1924.”30 By contrast, European diplomatic and consular records are widely regarded as
offering more impartial accounts.31 Written for internal consumption, rather than publicity or
propaganda purposes, their accounts also align with those of other witnesses to the massacres,
including travelers, Western journalists, and missionaries. Protestant missionaries left extensive
records, written at the time for internal communication purposes, that provide an invaluable
source of information regarding the massacres. This research utilizes a wide selection of these
archival and contemporary sources. Additionally, it incorporates relevant testimony from
victims of the massacres, from the Shoah Visual History archives. Collectively, these sources
allow for the construction of a representative depiction of Armenian resistance to the Hamidian
massacres.
There are a number of limitations to the methodology that must be acknowledged.
First, the research did not include material from Ottoman archives, although a wide range of
representative sources were used. Second, most of the information available about resistance to
the massacres comes from witness accounts. Only rarely do we hear directly from resisters
themselves. While a diversity of witness testimonies provide for triangulation and veri cation
of reports, the immediacy and directness of rst-hand accounts is lost. Finally, the exploratory
approach portrays a representative depiction of resistance, rather than a comprehensive one.
Further research is required to delve more deeply into the many aspects of Armenian resistance
to the Hamidian massacres.
It is also important to acknowledge the position of the author with respect to the
research. I approach this study as a genocide studies scholar and historian. I have long been
interested in how vulnerable populations respond to mass atrocities. While targeted groups are
often presented as passive victims in scholarship, my research has found—across multiple case
studies—that such groups often display incredible agency in the pursuit of self-protection.
Armenian Capacity for Resistance
Any examination of resistance must occur within the context of an understanding of the
capacity for such resistance. In the case of the Hamidian massacres, such capacity was very

28

Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Con ict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), 153–157.
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limited. Evidence indicates that in many—if not most—circumstances, resistance was
exceedingly dif cult or impossible. Armenians were typically a minority in any given town or
village, surrounded by a largely hostile local population. In addition, Ottoman authorities made
concerted efforts to forestall the possibility of resistance. Several speci c strategies were
employed to this end. Perhaps the most common, and effective, was that of con scating all
rearms from Armenians in anticipation of the violence. As tensions rose, local of cials would
demand that Armenians surrender their weapons, often on the imsiest of pretexts. In October
1895, for example, the authorities at Birejik ordered the Armenians to surrender their arms,
because “the Moslems were afraid of them.”32 Soldiers ostensibly sent to protect the disarmed
Armenians then instigated a massacre in early January, which completely destroyed the
Christian population there.33 In Kesserik, when a massacre threatened, the Armenians
“defended themselves energetically,” believing the attack was the “sole initiative” of the local
population.34 The Turks, however, informed provincial authorities, who sent soldiers and an
Armenian delegate to the village in response. The Armenians were persuaded to surrender their
weapons as a “sign of their submission to the government.”35 Once they had done so, however,
the soldiers withdrew, and the Turks attacked. Some of those trying to ee were killed by the
soldiers in the area.36 Similar records of Armenians being required to surrender their weapons,
from months to even just hours in advance of a massacre, are widespread.37
A second strategy commonly employed to prevent resistance was that of surprise.
While the situation in a given area might be tense for weeks or months, often it was unclear that
a massacre was imminent until its eruption. The massacre in Trezibond provides a case in point.
As one contemporary account put it:
For a week prior to the outbreak on October 8, there was great
excitement in Trebizond, and the consuls called in a body upon
the Vali, and urged him to arrest those who were exciting the
populace to deeds of violence. Matters apparently quieted
down for a few days, when, suddenly, like a clap of thunder in
a clear sky, the assault began. Unsuspecting people walking
along the streets were shot ruthlessly down.38
In Sivas, the violence was similarly unexpected. There, “suddenly at noon, as if at a
given signal” the massacre commenced.39 An eyewitness account noted: “No resistance was
made by the Armenians, who seemed overpowered in the suddenness of the onslaught, the
number of their armed assailants and the relentless ferocity with which they were pursued to
their death.”40 These examples highlight that in many cases, Armenians had nothing with which

32
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they could defend themselves, and no opportunity to prepare in advance of a massacre. In such
circumstances, resistance was simply not an option.
The Contours of Armenian Resistance
In circumstances in which Armenians were able to resist the massacres, they employed a
diverse range of strategies and approaches to doing so. Armed resistance varied from largescale, coordinated attempts to defend a city or region, to small-scale and individual efforts to
protect homes and lives. Armenians also widely employed a range of non-violent resistance
measures. These included attempting to purchase their safety or protection, seeking sanctuary
in places perceived as safe, and hiding from perpetrators. In some cases, communities worked
together in pursuit of such strategies, while in other cases, families or even individuals
attempted to resist on their own. The following section explores a representative cross-section of
the strategies, scope, and organizational characteristics of Armenian resistance.
Armed Resistance
During the course of the massacres, there were three large-scale, organized attempts at armed
resistance by the Armenians, in Zeitoun, Van, and Ourfa. The variable circumstances in which
each occurred, and their contrasting outcomes, offer substantial insight into the contexts of
resistance, and the factors that rendered successful resistance so dif cult. The failure of most
smaller-scale attempts at armed resistance reinforce these ndings.
In Zeitoun, a remote town located in a deep valley surrounded by mountains, the
Armenians decided to resist by launching a pre-emptive attack. Zeitounlis had a erce
reputation as a mountainous people with a history of attempting to defend themselves from
Ottoman encroachment.41 In October 1895, as reports reached Zeitoun of massacres in the
surrounding areas, and of a planned massacre for the town itself, the Zeitoulis decided to take
the offensive.42 They commenced an insurrection, besieging, and then seizing a Turkish garrison
on the outskirts of the town, along with establishing a defensive perimeter.43 In response,
government forces repeatedly attacked Zeitoun, leading to a series of ferocious battles. Tens of
thousands of Turkish soldiers and Kurkish and Circassian irregulars fought 1,500 or so
Zeitounli resisters but were unable to penetrate their defenses.44 In one battle to the east of the
city:
The Zeitounlis made a stand at a stone bridge which there
spans a rushing torrent. But after holding it bravely for awhile
they slowly retreated up a steep hill until almost the entire
Tukrish army had crossed the bridge, when suddenly the
bridge was blown up and the Zeitounlis turning, hurled down
from the hills above great rocks and poured upon them a most
destructive re. Hemmed in as they were the loss was very
great.45

41

James Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in the Autumn of 1876, 4th ed. revised (London:
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1896), 501.
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version consulted has been reprinted. Both citations have been included due to the importance of both
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The Ottoman advantage of numbers was outweighed by the Zeitounlis’ topographical
advantage, local knowledge of the terrain, excellent marksmanship, and desperate
determination to succeed.46
As news of the insurrection spread, the Zeitounlis had to contend with thousands of
refugees from massacres in the surrounding areas seeking safe haven in the town, along with
multiple requests for assistance from nearby villages under attack.47 While the Zeitounlis had
been well prepared, conditions began to deteriorate, with growing shortages of food and
ammunition.48 The Armenian death toll, from the ghting and the privations, reached several
thousand.49 At the same time, Turkish forces also took heavy losses. British Consul Barnham
estimated that by early January at least 5,000 soldiers had been killed, and possibly up to
10,000.50 In late December, the Armenian, Gregorian, and Catholic Patriachs, recognizing the
potential for wholesale slaughter in Zeitoun should the insurrection fail, requested the
assistance of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the
violence.51 The Sultan initially rejected the Ambassadors’ offer, hoping for outright victory.
Continued attempts to defeat the Zeitounlis were unsuccessful, however. As January
progressed, thousands more troops perished in battle, as well as due to the freezing winter
conditions. Both the Sultan and the Zeitounlis agreed to negotiations, and by the end of January
an agreement was reached. Christian and Moslem inhabitants in the region would surrender
their weapons; there would be a general amnesty and the expulsion from the empire of leaders
of the insurrection; a Christian governor would be appointed for the region; and there would be
relief for the Zeitounlis from excessive taxes.52 The agreement represented a major victory for
the Armenians of Zeitoun. Indeed, this became the most successful example of resistance to the
massacres.
In Van, too, Armenian resistance had some success. Armenians in the city there formed
the majority of the population, and there was some organized Armenian political activity, led by
three groups of revolutionaries. The proximity of Van to the Russian border, moreover, meant
that Armenians had easier access to arms in this region than elsewhere. For these reasons, it was
clear that Van would not be an easy target for massacre. Due to this, and the opposition of local
authorities to violence, it largely escaped the wave of massacres that swept through the empire
in late 1895.53 By June 1896, however, ongoing tensions—fermented by the government—
reached boiling point, and a massacre erupted. The three Armenian parties formed a Joint
Directorate of Defense, deploying 500 men in strategic positions around parts of the city.54 A
erce battle took place for control of the streets. Armenians in mixed areas were early targets,
and those unable to get to the Armenian quarters were massacred.55 Within the defended areas,
however, Armenian positions stood rm. They were aided by British Vice Consul Williams, who
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worked to protect the Armenians and negotiate a peaceful end to the violence.56 After nine days
of battle, agreement was reached whereby the revolutionaries would be allowed to leave the
country, and all weapons would be surrendered in exchange for a promise of protection. As the
revolutionaries were on route to Iran, however, the Turkish authorities abrogated the deal, and
most of those escaping were slaughtered.57 In the city itself, the promise of protection was
honored, with the many thousands of Armenians who had survived the battle thereby escaping
massacre. In the outlying regions of Van, largely unable to resist, it is estimated that around
20,000 Armenians were killed.58 Thus, the resistance in Van can be regarded as having
signi cant, albeit partial, success. The numerical strength of the Armenians, their ability to
access arms, and the mediation of British Vice Consul Williams all played a critical role in this
success.
In Ourfa, too, the Armenians attempted to defend themselves from the massacres. The
rst massacre there began in earnest on October 28, after a period of raised tensions. Expecting
the violence, many Armenians had remained at home. A “determined resistance” was made at
the entrances of the Armenian quarter.59 Armenian shops were looted, and Armenians found
outside the quarter attacked, but attempts to penetrate the quarter itself were unsuccessful.
Thereafter, the quarter was placed under siege, and several weeks of great tension ensued.60 The
government demanded the Armenians surrender all their weapons, promising protection if they
did so and threatening to attack the quarter with cannons if they did not.61 In November, the
Armenians reluctantly surrendered their weapons, and soldiers conducted extensive searches of
the quarter. Tensions did not ease. In December, rumors swirled of an imminent attack. When
the Armenians approached the government for the promised protection, several thousand
soldiers were dispatched to the Armenian quarter.62 Rather than offering protection, however,
they instigated renewed violence. A brutal massacre ensued against the now defenseless
Armenians.63 Men, women, and children were slaughtered, with entire families being killed in
some cases. Rape and torture were widespread. Thousands ed to the Gregorian Cathedral
seeking refuge. A Turkish mob attacked and began killing those inside before setting it alight.64
Those trying to ee were murdered by the crowd, while most perished in the ames. “The air of
the city was unendurable” from the stench of burning bodies, according to the lone American
missionary in the city.65 Altogether, several thousand Armenians perished in the massacre,
which many observers regarded as one of the most severe in the series. Armenian attempts at
resistance, successful at rst, ultimately led to terrible retribution and mass killing.
There were numerous other places where the Armenians took up arms to resist the
onslaught, albeit on a smaller scale. In the large Armenian village of Guermuch, near Ourfa, the
villagers took an extraordinary approach to try and prevent a massacre. As Kurds and Arabs
approached to attack, the Armenians pitched tents in front of the village, red off as many guns
as they could, and sent word that the tents were those of soldiers, sent by the government to
protect the village.66 Confused and deceived, the attackers withdrew. Later, the authorities in
Ourfa demanded the Armenians surrender their arms. Instead of doing so, they came in a group
to Ourfa, declaring that if the “government wished them to be massacred, they had better do so
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at once and on the spot in Ourfa, as they (the Armenians) were completely at their mercy, but
that they would never surrender their weapons, which were their only protection against the
surrounding armed and hostile Kurdish and Arab tribes.”67 After paying a ransom to keep their
weapons, they survived unmolested. In places like Aintab, Chemchem de Lidjé, Gurun,
Boussou, and elsewhere, Armenians mounted armed resistance for as long as they could, but
were overcome in a matter of days.68 In Diarbekier province, Armenians from three villages
close to the Magapavetzvotz monastery sought refuge there and resisted for six days, but were
ultimately overrun.69 In Andakh, Armenians resisted for six days with little more than stones
and daggers.70 When it became clear that further defense was hopeless, many threw themselves
into a ravine.71 These many accounts highlight the determination of the Armenians to resist
wherever and however possible, even in almost hopeless circumstances.
There are also recorded incidents of individual Armenians violently resisting the
massacres, like that of Krikor Haitaian’s mother, as described in the introduction. In GumushHane, the wealthy Armenian notable Nichan Israelian was threatened by a horde of seven to
eight hundred Turks, attracted by the prospect of plunder as the massacre got underway there.72
He managed to defend his property for three hours, before the Turks used petrol to set his
house alight.73 He then attempted to ee to the government buildings for protection, but was
shot dead on the way. Despite Israelian’s resistance being unsuccessful, a witness noted that it
prevented greater atrocities in the Armenian quarter of Gumush-Hane, as it occupied many
perpetrators for much of the period of the massacre.74 Such individual attempts at violent
resistance were even more likely to fail than coordinated attempts, and it is likely that most of
such attempts went unrecorded. Indeed, many Armenians, recognizing the likely futility of
violent resistance, utilized a range of non-violent strategies in attempting to survive the
massacres. The following section turns to examine these approaches.
Non-Violent Resistance
A major non-violent strategy employed by Armenians was that of attempting to purchase
immunity from the massacres. The most signi cant, and perhaps telling, example of this
occurred in the town of Egin, in the province of Harput (also referred to as Mamuret-Ul-Aziz),
in Eastern Turkey. Egin was described by missionary Emma Barnum—passing through in 1892
—as “a wonderful city.”75 Situated on a steep mountainside, with the Euphrates owing at its
base, it was green and picturesque. Barnum described the people as “aristocratic and formal,”
“re ned and neat.”76 “The houses are built of stone, are large and airy, and most of those I
visited were beautifully furnished. Egin was a wealthy city, but the people there as well as in
other places, are growing poor.”77 Estimates as to the number of Armenians, and Armenian
households, in Egin are variable. There were perhaps 1,100 households, and around 6,000
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Armenians in total.78 The city was intermingled, with approximately equal numbers of Moslems
and Christians. In 1895, as massacres threatened, the Armenians of Egin collectively decided on
a non-violent resistance strategy—that of purchasing immunity from the violence. They paid a
Kurdish chief 1,500 Turkish pounds to secure protection.79 At something like $200,000 US
dollars today, this equates to a payment of around $2,000 from every household. At the same
time, they also surrendered all their arms to the Turkish government.80 Their strategy proved
successful, and they were able to avoid being targeted in 1895, even as the violence spread with
great severity throughout the remainder of Harput.81
The reprieve proved not to last, however. In August 1896, when a massacre erupted in
Constantinople, the situation in Egin rapidly deteriorated. Local of cials seemed to perceive the
renewed unrest as an opportunity to target one of the very few places in Harput that had
escaped the violence and looting of the previous year.82 On September 15 at noon, a single
gunshot was red—the signal for the massacre to commence.83 For three days, the Armenians
were targeted in a massacre of particular severity. Estimates suggest that close to 2,000
Armenians were killed, including the majority of adult males.84 Women and children were also
targeted. Many women and girls committed suicide by throwing themselves into the Euphrates
river, to avoid being raped or killed.85 According to one report, “not one house was left
unplundered.”86 The vast majority of Armenian houses were then set alight, as were the
Armenian churches in the city.87 The evidence indicates that the massacre was of cially
sanctioned, and perpetrated by soldiers and local Turks rather than Kurds.88 In its aftermath, the
survivors in Egin were left destitute and homeless.
Attempts to purchase immunity from the massacres also occurred in numerous smaller
villages, with mixed results. In the Vilayet of Erzeroum, the village of Kamazor paid a ransom
in grain from the harvest and ten Turkish pounds; Dodoveran paid a ransom in grain; and
Ishgon paid a ransom of thirty Turkish pounds.89 Souk Chermak escaped attack by a payment
of 120 Turkish pounds.90 In this area, it seems likely that news of this strategy spread from one
village to another as a possible means of resistance. Abu-Sheikh, in the Egin district in Harput
province, paid 200 Turkish pounds in ransom.91 In the province of Diyarbekir, the inhabitants of
Tel-Arman also attempted to purchase their safety. Here, a Kurdish leader demanded payment
of 90 Turkish pounds for protection.92 After the Armenians paid, however, he increased his
demand to 400 pounds. This further payment did not protect the Armenians. The Kurds
78
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attacked and plundered Tel-Arman, and many Armenians were massacred.93 Occasionally,
individuals also sought to purchase their safety. In the village of Tevnik, in Erzeroum province,
an Armenian priest was attacked, and his house looted.94 To save his life, he promised his
attackers a payment of 100 liras. As soon as he escaped, he traveled to Erzeroum to lodge a
complaint about the matter but was shot dead in the violence there. This story highlights the
precarious position of the Armenians during the massacres. Attempts to purchase safety were a
high-risk strategy that often failed.
A second common non-violent strategy employed by the Armenians was to seek
sanctuary in places perceived as safe. The most effective of these proved to be consulates or
mission compounds. In Trezibond, for example, 150 Armenians took refuge at the Russian
consulate when massacres erupted in the town.95 All the consulates there “gave refuge to the
fugitives pursued by the assassins.”96 When the massacres reached Diarbekir in November
1895, more than 700 Christians took refuge at the French consulate.97 Kurdish desires to attack
the Consular building were repeatedly thwarted.98 In Trezibond, the Christian Brothers
establishment provided refuge for more than 2,000 Armenians during the massacres there,
while in Cesarea, missionaries managed to protect over 100 Armenians on their premises.99
During the massacres in the city of Harput, hundreds of Armenians sought refuge in the
missionary complex. As the attack progressed, however, the complex itself became a target.
Homes and buildings that were part of it were plundered and set alight. Eventually, the
missionaries and Armenians sought refuge in the college building. “At one time it looked as if
we should all go up in a ery chariot together” wrote missionary Susan Wheeler, “We shall
never forget this day the 12th and the night with the ames and clouds of smoke so dense about
us.”100 Some 450 Armenians and missionaries survived several extremely tense days in the
building, before the danger eased.101
In Van, the missionary station and the British Vice Consul worked together to protect
Armenians from the massacre there. Up to 15,000 Armenians sought shelter as the British Vice
Consul raised the Union Jack at the American mission, along with making “herculean efforts” to
save Armenians in the small Armenian quarter of the city.102 Not all those who sought refuge
survived the massacre—while the Mayor, Ghalib Pasha, initially received several hundreds of
Armenians, he later turned them out, and more than one hundred men and boys from the
group were then killed.103 In Erzeroum, attempts were made to prevent Armenians seeking
refuge in the consulates. In the street where the American Mission House and several consulates
were located, a patrol hid behind a woodpile in front of the French consulate and kept the area
under re to prevent Armenian access.104 The English consul stopped this by threatening to re
on the patrol if they continued.105 For those Armenians able to reach consulates or missionary
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complexes, this often—but not always—proved an effective way in which to survive the
massacres. However, the vast majority of Armenians, scattered in hundreds of towns and
villages throughout the empire, were unable to access these places of refuge.
Many Armenians attempted to survive the massacres through seeking refuge in
churches and cathedrals. This strategy often proved fatal. There are multiple accounts of
churches in which Armenians were sheltering being set alight, as in Ourfa. In Boussou, in
Harput province, for example, the Armenians successfully defended themselves from attack for
three days, before the attackers were reinforced with soldiers.106 The Armenians then took
refuge in their church. The attackers formed a cordon around the church to prevent escape, and
then set the church on re.107 In Edessa/Urhoy, west of Diyarbekir, Armenians also sought
refuge in their church. There they were attacked, and according to a Catholic priest from the
region, “blood owed in streams, covered the church and ran between the walls.”108 The church
was then set alight.109 In Shabin-Kara-Hissar-Sharki district in Sivas province, more than 2,000
persons took refuge in the Gregorian-Armenian church.110 After being forced to surrender, they
were massacred.111 In Malatia, in Harput province, the Armenians gathered in two churches and
attempted to defend themselves, until they had no choice but to surrender. In one of the
churches, the Armenians gave up their arms in exchange for protection, but were then
surrounded, with many of them killed.112 In some places, by contrast, churches were not
attacked. In Aintab, for example, they provided a place of refuge for an extended period.113 In
Constantinople, the Ambassadors of the Great Powers were disturbed to learn that Armenians
taking refuge in the churches there had been surrounded by police, who were preventing
supplies of food from reaching the refugees.114 More than 2,000 Armenians sought refuge in this
way, but ultimately, the Ambassadors negotiated their peaceful departure from the churches.115
In most cases, Moslem attackers demonstrated no respect for the sanctity of churches, and they
did not prove a safe haven.
When the massacres erupted, many Armenians tried to hide in order to save their lives.
Vahram Eretzian survived the massacres as a young child in Aghen, in Harput province, when a
local Turk hid 13 Armenians in a dark, secret room at his home.116 But his survival came at a
terrible cost. Just as an armed mob was approaching the home, a two-year-old boy hiding with
them began to cry, but then suddenly fell silent. After the danger passed, someone lit a match,
and it became clear that the boy had been strangled. Vahram recalled: “Nobody asked anything,
but that child saved 12 Armenians with his death.”117 E atoon Elmajian also survived the
massacres by hiding, aged just ve years old.118 E atoon’s parents wanted to escape and hide
from an impending massacre, but with two other young children, they could not take him with
them as well. Before eeing their home, they put him in a bread box, a large round box about 90
centimeters in diameter, which was usually used to store the family’s bread supply. Told to pray,
he repeated the Lord’s Prayer in his hiding place even as the house was plundered.
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Miraculously, his hiding place was not discovered. In the evening, his parents were overjoyed to
nd him still alive.119
Armenians hid anywhere they could to survive. This included in garrets under straw,
under manure heaps, under piles of charcoal, and in wells.120 For some, “their shelters proved to
be a living grave.”121 Armenians in rural areas were sometimes able to take advantage of their
surroundings in order to hide. Five Armenians escaped the massacre at Schepik, near Arabkir,
by hiding in a cave for twelve days.122 Another survivor, writing of his experiences escaping the
massacres, commented that “for eight days, the brambles of the desert were our bed and the
stones our pillow.”123 Many such hiding places were highly precarious. In one case, three
brothers hiding amongst some trees were caught by soldiers and brutally murdered, while their
mother, hiding nearby, could do nothing but watch.124 Others survived by hiding amongst rocks
and thickets, moving about as they could, lacking even the most basic necessities.125 While
many were caught and murdered, the relatively short duration of the massacres in most places
meant that for some, these strategies enabled them to survive.
Some Armenians sought assistance from local Turks or Kurds to survive the massacres.
While the evidence suggests that most of the Moslem population was hostile to the Armenians,
in a small minority of cases, Armenians were hidden or protected from the violence by their
neighbors or friends. In Erzeroum, for example, many Turks hid Armenians in their homes or
shops while the massacre raged.126 In one case, a Turk saved an Armenian by telling the soldiers
that wanted to kill him that he would march him off to the Government House to be hanged.
Once out of the soldiers’ sight, he then took the Armenian to a safe place, before later enabling
him to return home.127 In Aintab, British Consul Barnham reported that “some of the Moslem
inhabitants behaved with great humanity in protecting Christians, and it is said that nearly
2,000 Armenians took refuge in their houses.”128 Many of those who sought assistance from
Turks or Kurds, however, found themselves cruelly betrayed. In Sassoun province, a group of
one hundred or so refugees who had ed the massacres appealed to the local Hinatsee tribe of
Kurds for protection. The Kurds seemed to promise protection, but after luring the group to a
ravine, proceeded to rape, plunder, and murder them.129 In another case, an Armenian woman
was discovered hiding in a straw bin as her house was plundered. The Kurd who discovered
her demanded her shoes; after surrendering them, she begged he take her and her small son to a
place of refuge. Somewhat surprisingly, he did so. When she exclaimed “Glory to thee, Jesus!”
however, the Kurd remarked that her misfortunes were because of such beliefs.130 As soon as
the opportunity presented itself, the woman ed, fearing again for her safety.131 As is the case
with other episodes of mass violence against speci cally targeted groups, only a tiny minority
of the wider population offered assistance to the victims.
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Resistance to Forced Conversion
During the massacres, thousands of Armenians were confronted with the terrible choice of
converting to Islam or being killed. A remarkable number chose to resist by refusing to
convert.132 The clergy were a speci c target of the perpetrators for forced conversion. For
example, the preacher Hanna Sedha was caught by Kurds while trying to ee but refused to
accept Islam to save his life. According to the missionary records: “The last seen of him by one
of his church members as he looked back in his ight, he was extending his arms to ward off the
sword blows which hewed him down after which a gun was discharged into his body.”133 In a
seven-page tribute to the “noble army of martyrs,” Protestant missionary Carrie Bush outlined
the stories of many preachers and pastors similarly killed for refusing to convert.134 Often the
clergy were tortured, prior to being killed, for refusing to accept Islam. In Zileh, in Sivas
province, the priests Der Arisdakes and Der Megherditsch were killed for refusing to convert:
“the former was previously blinded, the latter was skinned.”135 At Tadem, the Archimandrite
(monastic priest) Ohannes Papizian had his hands cut off for refusing to convert, and then his
arms at the elbow. When he still refused, he was beheaded.136
Entire communities faced similarly stark choices. In Harput, many Armenians sought
refuge from the massacres in a church. Induced to come out, they were allowed to pass through
the door only one at a time. “Each one, as he came out of the church, was invited to embrace
Mohammedanism. All who refused were killed on the spot. Fifty-two thus accepted
martyrdom, among them the venerable Protestant Pastor Krikor.”137 At Schepik, near Arabkir,
almost all the young men of the village—along with two priests—were killed for refusing to
convert.138 In Birejik, soldiers appeared to systematically search for men, killing all those they
found who refused to accept Islam.139 One “old man” was tortured with hot coals, “and as he
was writhing in torture they held a Bible before him and mockingly asked him to read them
some of the promises in which he had trusted.”140 In another case, a survivor reported his “old
Aunt Eva” as having been “cut to pieces before our eyes” for refusing to embrace Islam.141
Resistance through refusing to convert, even in the face of certain death, was a signi cant and
widespread form of resistance during the massacres.
Questioning the Boundaries of Resistance: Forced Conversion and Suicide
Armenians during the Hamidian massacres took two further courses of action to attempt to
alter their fate, which may arguably be considered forms of resistance. The rst was to convert
to Islam in order to save their lives. Tens of thousands of Armenians converted during the
course of the massacres. Evidence indicates that in a great number of cases such conversion was
insincere and undertaken purely to avoid being killed. There is no doubt that huge pressure was
placed on Armenians to convert.142 In places like Birejik, about half the adult Christian men
were killed, while “the other half have become Mussulmans to save their lives, so that there is
not a single Christian left in Birejik today.”143 In Harput, “two hundred families had to profess
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Islam under threats of death.”144 Forcible conversion was extensive throughout the regions
impacted by the massacres, with innumerable similar accounts. Arguably, as an “attempt by the
oppressed [individual or group] to limit, thwart or end that oppression,” forced conversion may
be considered as a form of resistance.145 Yet, there are also persuasive arguments against this
position. To convert to Islam was to effectively surrender Armenian identity, meeting a key goal
of the perpetrators.146 Moreover, Armenians were likely aware that this was potentially an
irrevocable decision, with the punishment for apostasy in Islam being death. Thus, while it is
clear that many Armenians converted to Islam to save their lives, it is less clear the extent to
which these actions should be regarded as resistance.
Suicide was perhaps the most desperate strategy utilized by Armenians during the
massacres. In many cases, suicide was undertaken as a group. Predominantly women and
children appear to have committed suicide, often to escape sexual violence and slavery. In the
village of Ozoonovah/Ozunonah in Harput province, for example, 55 Armenian women and
girls were “carried off” by Moslems.147 While being transported along the Euphrates river, “by a
swift decision, they all jumped into the river and drowned themselves to escape a life of
Mohammedan slavery and bestiality.”148 As the massacre in Egin was underway, many women
and girls similarly threw themselves in the Euphrates and drowned.149 In the villages around
the town of Baiburt, “about fty young women threw themselves into the wells, and thus met
death, to escape dishonor.”150 Reports of women and girls committing suicide to escape rape
and forced marriage come from a wide range of regions.151 Considering whether such suicides
constitute a form of resistance, however, raises complex issues. While suicide may indeed
thwart or limit the oppression that would otherwise be experienced by the victim, it also
effectively meets the murderous goals of the perpetrators. Yet, some have argued that suicide
amidst mass violence should be considered an act of resistance. This perspective sees suicide as
an act of de ance—one “made to rob a perpetrator of an opportunity to kill and allow a victim
to meet death on her own terms.”152 In Nazi concentration camps, suicides “often had an
extremely important function as a dramatic protest against the idea and ideology of the
camp.”153 In the Hamidian massacres, they allowed Armenian women to preserve their dignity,
even when faced with death.154 In many cases, perhaps suicide was the only way in which
Armenians could resist the massacres, and therefore should be considered as such.
Resistance and Survival
Several ndings can be made with respect to Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres.
First, the sheer prevalence of resistance is a notable feature. In many cases, resistance was not
possible; but when it was possible, it appears to have been widespread. Armenians
demonstrated tremendous agency in seeking to ameliorate their circumstances however they
could. Agency, that is “the choices individuals have, take or don’t take, the decisions and actions
of individuals, and the consequence of these actions,” has been widely recognized as playing an
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important role in the dynamics of survival during mass atrocities.155 As Frédéric Mégret has
noted, “of all those who escaped atrocities while atrocities were being committed, a very large
proportion owed their rescue to themselves, the courage of ordinary strangers or resistance
movements.”156 For the Armenians, agency involved deploying any potential asset that might
prove helpful for survival. This included everything from utilizing advantageous topography to
the assistance of foreign diplomats. Intracommunal cooperation was critical to large-scale
attempts at resistance, including armed resistance in Zeitoun, Van, and Ourfa, and the nonviolent resistance in Egin. Evidence indicates that intracommunal cooperation and resistance are
strategies that can facilitate communal self-protection during mass violence.157 Also clear,
however, is the hostile environment that surrounded the Armenians. There are only a small
number of cases of Turks or Kurds offering genuine assistance to save or protect Armenians
from the violence. It appears that the Armenians tried everything possible to resist the
Hamidian massacres, within the con nes of the dire circumstances in which they found
themselves.
Despite these extensive efforts, the vast majority of resistance attempts had poor
outcomes. This is a consistent nding across multiple parameters. With the exception of Zeitoun
(and the partial exception of Van), attempts at armed resistance were largely unsuccessful. In
many cases, the perpetrators exacted terrible vengeance once the resistance had been overcome.
Successful armed resistance appears to have required an exceptional circumstance: in Zeitoun,
where the Turkish army simply could not defeat the Zeitounlis; in Van, where the external
intervention of British Consul Williams tempered the outcome; and in Guermuch, where
incredibly, the Armenians bluffed their way to survival. Most other attempts at armed
resistance, whether large-scale or small, were crushed. Unarmed resistance was similarly
unlikely to succeed, with the exception of exceptional circumstances. Here too, external
involvement, either from diplomatic of cials or missionaries, often tempered the outcome, as in
the city of Harput. Communal attempts at non-violent resistance, such as purchasing immunity
or seeking sanctuary in churches, often proved ineffective. Some individuals and small groups
were able to successfully evade the massacres through hiding wherever they could, but many
more, it seems, could not. Despite the agency of the Armenians in attempting to protect
themselves, and despite the diversity of strategies and approaches, resistance proved largely
futile.
This study of resistance enables broader re ection on a key issue long debated in
studies of the Hamidian massacres—that of the role of the Abdul Hamid II regime in their
perpetration. As Boris Adjemian and Mikaël Nichanian have noted, “interpretations deeply
diverge on this matter.”158 Taner Akçam, for example, has asserted: “it is clear that the massacres
of 1894–96 were centrally planned.”159 Ronald Suny similarly adopts this position, declaring
“blame for the mass killing of Armenians in the mid-1890s must fall on the highest levels of the
state.”160 By contrast, Robert Melson did not come to a rm conclusion on the matter, suggesting
only that the sultan “initiated or tolerated” the massacres.161 Abdul Hamid’s biographer,
François Georgeon, contends that to ascribe the massacres to the Sultan would be to ignore “the
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extreme prudence in foreign and domestic policy that he manifested during his long reign,”
emphasizing the responsibility of local authorities for the massacres.162 A multitude of Turkish
sources also deny any of cial sanction of the atrocities.
The present study provides strong evidence in favor of the central organization, and
orders, for the massacres. The overall failure of Armenian resistance, despite all efforts, is
telling. Armenians were repeatedly disarmed by Turkish soldiers prior to the onset of
massacres, such as in Birejik and in Ourfa (as they were under siege). Those that attempted
armed resistance often found themselves ghting against government forces.163 In Zeitoun,
literally thousands of Turkish soldiers were brought into the region to try and defeat the
Zeitounlis. In Ourfa, the government promised protection to Armenians even as it demanded
their disarmament. When the Armenians sought such protection, however, soldiers instigated a
massacre that killed several thousand. These events indicate a pattern in which Armenian
resistance was repeatedly crushed by government forces. Similar inferences regarding
government involvement can be made with respect to the complete failure of government forces
to curb the violence or protect Armenians from it. While accounts abound of the role of of cials
in instigating massacres and tolerating the violence, there is a conspicuous absence of accounts
in which of cials acted to forestall or curb massacres. Foreign diplomats and missionaries,
despite their small number and very limited capacity, were able to save literally thousands of
lives, but there is no record of Ottoman government intervention similarly providing protection.
Collectively, the evidence demonstrates a high degree of culpability of the Ottoman government
in the perpetration of the massacres.
Conclusion
This study provides strong evidence that Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres was
widespread. Everywhere they could, Armenians sought to survive and resist the violence, using
a wide range of strategies. In places in which they had a numerical or topographical advantage,
such as Zeitoun and Van, armed group resistance was the preferred strategy. In other locations,
Armenians chose to violently resist even when prospects of survival seemed bleak. In many
communities, non-violent strategies such as attempts to purchase immunity, to seek sanctuary,
or to hide seemed to offer the best prospects of success. Armenians used their local knowledge,
ingenuity, and determination to survive in whatever ways they could. It is dif cult to assess the
impact of Armenian resistance to the violence. In Zeitoun and Van, it unquestionably saved the
lives of thousands of Armenians. In other places, like Egin, it appears to have only delayed the
violence. Moreover, in many places in which resistance was defeated, the perpetrators appear to
have sought retribution through more extreme acts of violence, that entirely destroyed the
communities involved. Ultimately, the ferocity of the massacres, and the powerlessness of the
Armenians, overwhelmed attempts to ameliorate the impact of the violence. While some
individuals, such as Krikor Haitaian, survived due to acts of resistance, more than 100,000
Armenians perished in the massacres.
The impact of Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres goes well beyond a
reckoning of lives saved, however. The many acts of resistance—those successful and those
defeated—stand as a testament to a proud people. Armenians were determined to maintain
their identity in spite of the oppression they experienced, a determination that continues today.
There is every reason to suggest some of the courageous acts of resistance during the massacres
may have inspired Armenian resistance during the subsequent genocide. The Armenians of
Musa Dagh were undoubtedly aware of the resistance of the Zeitounlis in the massacres when
they chose to resist during the genocide. Van, which had some success in resisting the
massacres, also mounted a resistance to the genocide that saved many thousands of lives.
Perhaps this legacy of resistance continues to inspire the Armenian people today, as they now
battle against genocide denial.
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